Archive for January, 2019

Developmental differences in value‐based decisions from memory

Sebastian Horn, Thorsten Pachur, and I have a new paper out comparing children and young adults on value-based decisions from memory. We adapted a neat paradigm (see above for a rough depiction) that allows a good control of the information to be compared in memory and can give some insight in to potential differences between children of different ages and adults’ decisions requiring the comparison of gains and losses from memory. Our results suggest that children were somewhat less efficient in making such decisions due to developmental differences in both memory and aritmethic abilities. We believe this work illustrates how it is possible to assess the contribution of different core abilities (such as memory or arithmetic skill) to individual and age differences in decision making.  The abstract and full reference are given below.

Good + Bad = ? Developmental Differences in Balancing Gains and Losses in Value‐Based Decisions From Memory

Value‐based decisions often involve comparisons between benefits and costs that must be retrieved from memory. To investigate the development of value‐based decisions, 9‐ to 10‐year olds (N = 30), 11‐ to 12‐year olds (N = 30), and young adults (N = 30) first learned to associate gain and loss magnitudes with symbols. In a subsequent decision task, participants rapidly evaluated objects that consisted of combinations of these symbols. All age groups achieved high decision performance and were sensitive to gain–loss magnitudes, suggesting that required core cognitive abilities are developed early. A cognitive‐modeling analysis of performance revealed that children were less efficient in object evaluation (drift rate) and had longer nondecision times than adults. Developmental differences, which emerged particularly for objects of high positive net value, were linked to mnemonic and numerical abilities.

Horn, S. S., Mata, R., & Pachur, T. (2019). Good + Bad = ? Developmental Differences in Balancing Gains and Losses in Value-Based Decisions From Memory. Child Development, 107, 21767. http://doi.org/10.1111/cdev.13208

 

bright young things in economics

The xmas issue of The Economist presents a (gender-balanced!) list of 8 new stars of economics. I found it interesting to learn about the work of these very accomplished “bright young things” but derived even more pleasure from the historical narrative in the piece (perhaps, I admit, because it mostly matched my preconceptions about the recent history of economics…). 

The Economist has compiled such lists 4 times by now (1988, 1998, 2008, 2018) and so the piece compares the pool of chosen individuals to provide an historical overview of the field. 

According to The Economist, in 1988, empirical work enjoyed little prestige in economics and so most of the individuals picked as representing promise in the field were theorists with little concern for data analysis (think Paul Krugman). The piece quotes a poignant statement from the 80s by Edward Leamer: “Hardly anyone takes data analysis seriously. Or perhaps more accurately, hardly anyone takes anyone else’s data analysis seriously”. 

In 1998, a wave of empiricism started that continued since, with the application of economics to many different applied fields (think Levitt’s Freakonomics) and a focus on quasi-experimental methods for causal inference (think Angrist and Pischke’s Mostly harmless economics). This empirical turn of economics has been criticised for neglecting theory, being too “cute and clever”, and “looking for keys under lampposts”. In a nutshell, the bright economists of the 98/08 cohorts were criticised for showing more allegiance to their preferred tools (e.g., regression discontinuity, instrumental variable regression) than to substantive theory and questions, which led to a “hit-and-run” strategy of publishing on a given topic/dataset that allowed applying the method rather than a long-term strategy to explore a fundamental question. 

The 2018 cohort, The Economist suggests, has liberated itself from the empiricist growingpains of its predecessors and is allying methodological sophistication with the pursuit of important theoretical questions and societal problems, such as the economics education or inequality. In sum, the field has finally found the right balance of important issues, theory, and empirics (ah, what a bright future awaits us!). Ok, this sounds a bit too good to be true but it’s the Xmas issue after all…

You can read the full piece here. 

How similarity between choice options affects decisions from experience: The accentuation-of-differences model

Gestern wurde unser Aufsatz zur Kontextabhängigkeit erfahrungsbasierter Entscheidungen bei Psychological Review veröffentlicht. Dieses Manuskript ist eine Open-Access-Publikation und ist daher für alle unter http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/rev0000122 frei zugänglich.

Zusammenfassung

Im Alltag treffen Menschen viele verschiedene Entscheidungen. Manche dieser Entscheidungen basieren auf expliziten Beschreibungen der verschiedenen Alternativen, wohingegen in anderen Fällen die Eigenschaften der Alternativen zunächst durch Erfahrungen mit diesen erlernt werden müssen. Eine der bemerkenswerten Beobachtungen in der Entscheidungsforschung ist die Kontextabhängigkeit von Entscheidungen, also dass Entscheidungen von den zur Verfügung stehenden Alternativen abhängen. Durch diese Kontextabhängigkeit entstehen eine Reihe von sogenannten Kontexteffekten, die Verletzungen der normativen Entscheidungstheorie darstellen. Es wird häufig angenommen, dass eine mehrdimensionale Repräsentation der Eigenschaften von Alternativen der Hauptgrund für die Entstehung von Kontexteffekten ist. In dem Manuskript entwickeln wir das accentuation-of-differences-Modell, das diese Annahme infrage stellt. Dieses Lernmodell nimmt an, dass keine explizite Repräsentation der Eigenschaften von Alternativen gebildet wird, sondern dass die Nützlichkeit von Alternativen eindimensional erlernt wird. Jedoch wird diese Repräsentation von Nützlichkeit kontextabhängig erlernt; Alternativen, deren Ausgänge über die Zeit ähnlich sind, werden als weniger attraktiv erachtet. Unser Modell sagt bestimmte Verhaltensmuster vorher, die durch andere Modelle nicht erklärt werden können. In einer Reihe von Experimenten zeigen wir, dass erfahrungsbasierte Entscheidungen kontextabhängig sind und dass das accentuation-of-differences-Modell das Verhalten am besten beschreiben kann.

Spektor, M. S., Gluth, S., Fontanesi, L., & Rieskamp, J. (2019). How similarity between choice options affects decisions from experience: The accentuation-of-differences model. Psychological Review, 126, 52-88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/rev0000122

new year resolutions

The start of a new year is often a time for self-improvement and setting new goals. Here are a number of laudable goals for 2019 focusing on “a systemic change for science, to turn away from a growth paradigm and to refocus on quality, characterized by curiosity, surprise, discovery, and societal relevance.” (Seppelt et al., 2018). 

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Seppelt, R., Beckmann, M., Václavík, T., & Volk, M. (2018). The Art of Scientific Performance. Trends in Ecology & Evolution, 33(11), 805–809. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.tree.2018.08.003

Three gaps and what they may mean for risk preference

Ralph Hertwig, Dirk Wulff, and I have a new paper out that identifies/summarizes three gaps that have emerged from recent work in economics and psychology on risk preference…

Three gaps and what they may mean for risk preference 

Risk preference is one of the most important building blocks of choice theories in the behavioural sciences. In economics, it is often conceptualized as preferences concerning the variance of monetary payoffs, whereas in psychology, risk preference is often thought to capture the propensity to engage in behaviour with the potential for loss or harm. Both concepts are associated with distinct measurement traditions: economics has traditionally relied on behavioural measures, while psychology has often relied on self-reports. We review three important gaps that have emerged from work stemming from these two measurement traditions: first, a description– experience gap which suggests that behavioural measures do not speak with one voice and can give very different views on an individual’s appetite for risk; second, a behaviour–self-report gap which suggests that different self-report measures, but not behavioural measures, show a high degree of convergent validity; and, third, a temporal stability gap which suggests that self-reports, but not behavioural measures, show considerable temporal stability across periods of years. Risk preference, when measured through self-reports—but not behavioural tests—appears as a moderately stable psychological trait with both general and domain-specific components. We argue that future work needs to address the gaps that have emerged from the two measurement traditions and test their differential predictive validity for important economic, health and well-being outcomes. 

Hertwig, R., Wulff, D. U., & Mata, R. (2019). Three gaps and what they may mean for risk preference. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 374(1766), 20180140–10. http://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2018.0140